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A TIME TO OPEN AND A TIME TO
CLOSE-MUNICIPAL REGULATION
OF BUSINESS HOURS
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
If there is truly "a time for every matter under heaven,"' does that
include a time when a place of business should open and a time when
it should shut its doors? Is it lawful and appropriate for the
government-municipal government in particular-to set the times
when the opening and closing should occur? With more and more
commercial establishments remaining open very long hours, often 24
hours a day, while nearby residents and competing businesses
frequently lobby for legislation that would limit such hours of
operation, questions regarding municipal power in this area assume
increased importance. In examining this area of regulation, it is
necessary to consider (1) what purposes for municipal restrictions on
business hours are valid, (2) what purposes are improper, (3) other
limitations on governmental exercise of authority besides the proper-
purpose requirement, such as prohibitions against discrimination, (4)
the forms of legislation available for use, and (5) the division of
authority between state and local governments. An examination of
* Professor of Law and Maurice H. Merrill Distinguished Scholar, University of
Oklahoma.
1. Ecclesiastes 3:1 (Rev. Standard).
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these topics will delineate the circumstances under which legislative
bodies are likely to impose, and courts are likely to uphold,
restrictions on business hours.
II. VALID PURPOSES
Regulation of the times during which businesses may remain open
occurs frequently at the local level as a result of municipal
governments' exercise of the police power widely delegated to them
by the state.2 Thus, as a general rule, the validity of the regulation
depends on the existence on some police-power purpose, or as one
court noted, "the nature of the business must be such that the public
health, morals, safety, or general welfare is, or might be, affected by
such business being permitted to remain open or continue after
certain hours."3 In the absence of such a purpose, courts will likely
strike down an attempted restriction as "a tyrannical interference" 4
with the right of business operators to earn a living in the manner
they choose. On the other hand, where a police-power purpose does
exist, it can sometimes even justify exclusion of a business from
certain areas of the city, or from the city altogether. Therefore a valid
purpose can surely justify limiting the hours of the business's
operation.5
III. NOISE CONTROL
What are examples of purposes by which closing-hour legislation
may reasonably contribute to the public health, safety, morality or
general welfare? Reducing noise levels particularly at night, has been
recognized as a proper reason for limiting the hours of businesses
2. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 503 (1982). See generally 7
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 24.198-245.456 (3d ed. rev. 1997).
3. Annotation, Validity of statute or ordinance fixing closing hours for certain kinds of
business, 55 A.L.tR 242,242 (1928).
4. Town ofCoaticook v. Lothrop [1902) C.S. 225, 228 (Can.) (city lacked power under
statute); cf. Beauvais v. City of Montreal [1906] C.S. 427 (Can.) (holding enabling act either
unconstitutional or, if constitutional, did not authorize closing ordinance, and ordinance was not
within municipality's common-law police power).
5. See City of Charleston v. Jenkins, 133 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 1963) (upholding
ordinance that prohibited dispensing of beer in any place of business between 1:30 a.m. and
7:00 a.m.).
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such as restuarants because it is related to public health.6
Accordingly, an ordinance requiring restaurants located in residential
zones of the city to cease operations between 1:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.
has been upheld as a reasonable attempt to reduce noise and maintain
order where the sleep of nearby residents might otherwise be
disturbed.7
As always, there are counter arguments. A court may be
persuaded that the proper approach is to attack noise problems
directly by ordinances against unnecessary horn-honking, loud and
boisterous talking, and/or disorderly conduct, rather than using the
more indirect means of restricting restaurant operating hours! While
there is no reasonable need to force the closing of all restaurants or
all businesses merely because a few restaurants have become
nuisances,9 an ordinance limited to residential zones'0 or to an area in
which disturbances of the public peace have occurred" is justifiable.
Most courts seem willing to go one step further and uphold
restrictions on all restaurants, or all businesses of a certain type,
because of noise problems created by some establishments. Thus,
where a community experienced "great disturbances" due to noise
and violation of curfew laws by patrons of "juice bars," the
6. See State v. Grant, 216 A.2d 790 (N.H. 1966) (upholding town regulation requiring all
restaurants to be closed between midnight and 6:00 a.m.). See generally Marc L. Carmichael
Annotation, Validity of Municipal Ordinance Regulating Time During Which Restaurant
Business May Be Conducted, 53 A.L.R.3d 942 (1973). Annotation, What Constitutes a
Restaurant, 122 A.L.R- 1399 (1939). Annotation, What Amounts to "Restaurant" or
"Restaurant Business" Within Intoxicating Liquor Law, 105 A.L.R. 566 (1936); Annotation,
What is "Restaurant, - "Caf, " or "Victualing House" Within Sunday Law, 9 A.L.R. 428
(1920).
7. City of Burlington v. Jay Lee, Inc., 290 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1972).
8. See Fincher v. City of Union, 196 S.E. 1 (S.C. 1938) (invalidating an ordinance
requiring barbecue stands in residential areas to close between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.); cf. Ex
parte Hall, 195 P. 975 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920) (unvalidating statute prohibiting dancing or
dance music in any room situated within 25 feet of residence on ground that less drastic and
more specific regulations could achieve the desired goals).
9. See Painter v. Town of Forest Acres, 97 S.E.2d 71 (S.C. 1957) (enjoining enforcement
of town ordinance requiring all businesses to close between midnight and 6:00 a.m.); cf. Town
of Dyess v. Williams, 444 S.W.2d 701 (Ark. 1969) (invalidating ordinance requiring all
businesses to remain closed between midnight and 4:00 am.).
10. See City of Burlington, 290 A.2d at 23 (upholding ordinance prohibiting restaurants in
any residential zone of city from remaining open between 1:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.).
11. See Grant, 216 A.2d at 790 upholding conviction upheld for violating ordinance
prohibiting operation of restaurant between midnight and 6:00 a.m.).
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municipality was allowed to prohibit the operation of all such
businesses during early morning hours.'
2
Sometimes the restriction is more limited in scope, as where it is
made a condition of an exception or variance granted to a particular
business under zoning laws.13 Relief of this kind allows a use not
ordinarily permitted in the particular zone. In awarding such a
dispensation, the appropriate administrative body may attach
reasonable conditions, including limits on hours of operation.
Situations where conditional variances may be appropriate include
allowing a restaurant to operate in a residential zone,14 granting a
special exception to a swimming club, ts or allowing a gasoline station
and garage to operate despite some risk of disturbing nearby property
owners.1
6
Closing-hour requirements have been recognized as justifiable
conditions on the awarding of exceptions or variances so long as the
conditions have a reasonable relation to public health, safety or
welfare. Courts have upheld closing-hour requirements in cases
where the sale of ice cream products 7 or the operation of a
laundromat 8 is allowed in an area where such a use is ordinarily
12. David E. Shelton Prod., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 520 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988).
13. See Annotation, Imposing Restrictions as to Hours or Days of Operation of Business
as Condition ofAllowance of Special Zoning Exception or Variance, 99 A.L.R.2d 227 (1965).
14. Montgomery County v. Mossburg, 180 A.2d 851 (Md. 1962) (holding 11:00 p.m.
closing hour proper condition on grant of special exception allowing enlargement of restaurant
that was non-conforming use in residential zone).
15. See Foust v. Springfield Township, 77 Mont. Co. L.R. 242 (Pa. 1960) (conditioning
special exception granted to swimming club over objections of neighbors on cessation of all
activities at the club at 9:00 p.m.).
16. See Lough v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 60 A.2d 839 (PI. 1948) (noting nine conditions
attached to grant of exception for gasoline station and garage, including prohibitions on
automobile repair work on Sunday or after 9:00 p.m. on other days, and gasoline sales after
10:00 p.m. any day). But see Berdan v. City of Paterson, 62 A.2d 680 (N.J. 1948) (holding
zoning board lacked authority to grant variance allowing "heavy industrial" uses in residential
zone).
17. Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., 146 A.2d 257 (N.H. 1958) (holding
11:00 p.m. closing hour valid condition on grant of variance for sale of ice cream and other
dairy products).
18. See State ex rel. 12501 Superior Corp. v. City of East Cleveland, 158 N.E.2d 565
(Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (upholding restrictions requiring automatic laundry to close at midnight
Saturday and not reopen until midnight Sunday as condition of permit for operation in zone
where laundries usually not allowed).
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impermissible and could create disturbing levels of noise if
unrestricted.
Even if zoning laws permit a particular use, the hours of operation
may be limited. Any business may be subject to police-power
regulations designed to curtail bothersome noise. Thus, an ordinance
forbidding coin-operated self-service car washes from remaining
open between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. has been upheld as applied to
a car wash whose operation generated complaints from neighbors of
loud noise and beer drinking during late evening and early morning
hours.' 9 However, the restriction must be so framed that it reasonably
contributes to the general welfare.20 Courts are unlikely to uphold a
closing-hour limitation if it applies only or chiefly to activities
conducted inside a building that will therefore not disturb the
neighbors,2' or if it applies only to some limited time-period, such as
Monday mornings, when no special need for quiet is proven.
22
Analogous support for the validity of closing-hour legislation
aimed at reducing noise arises in cases upholding "Sunday blue
laws." These laws, which prohibit the conduct of certain businesses
and/or the sale of certain products on Sunday, are much less common
than at one time. Where still found, Sunday blue laws are often
unpopular and subject to frequent attack in the courts. 23 The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, has held that these laws are reasonably
designed to promote public health and well-being by securing a
19. People v. Raub, 155 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
20. See Wartman v. City of Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 202, 209 (1859) (holding city could fix
time and place of public markets for sale of food in order to promote public welfare and
preserve peace).
21. See City of Rochester v. Close, 35 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 208 (1885). On the other hand, hours
regulations as to street markets and outdoor peddling have often been upheld. See City of
Bowling Green v. Caron, 73 Ky. (10 bush) 64 (1873) (fixing hours for street market); City of
Buffalo v. Schleifer, 21 N.Y.S. 913 (Super. Ct. Buf. 1893) (limiting hours for peddling in the
streets); Mt. Carmel Borough v. Fisher, 21 Pa. Super., 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1902) (establishing
hours for curbstone markets). But see City of Buffalo v. Linsman, 98 N.Y.S. 737 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1906) (invalidating same ordinance upheld in Shleifer, 21 N.Y.S. 913, on ground of
discnmination against street peddlers and in favor of shopkeepers).
22. Spann v. Gaither, 136 A. 41, 43-44 (Md. 1927) (holding ordinance prohibiting
operation of laundry between midnight Saturday and 6:00 a.m. Monday invalid as applied to
first six hours of Monday).
23. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of "Sunday
Closing" or "'Blue" Laws-Modern Status, 10 A.L.R.4th 246, 252-53 (1981). See generally
REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 514-16.
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common day of rest and relaxation and do not violate the
constitutional prohibition against governmental establishment of
religion.24 Sunday closing requirements can even be valid when
applied to automated operations, such as coin-operated laundries, at
which no employees are kept on duty on Sunday.25 Sociological and
statistical evidence can demonstrate a reasonable connection between
Sunday closing requirements and peace and quiet within a
community.26 Courts have permitted municipalities to enforce
Sunday blue laws more extensive in their scope of prohibition than
are the state statutes on the subject,27 and to apply their prohibitions
to such relatively quiet and innocuous trades as barbering.28
However, if a particular law does not substantially contribute to the
establishment of a uniform day of rest,29 is unnecessary to the
promotion of peace and quiet within a community,30 or is otherwise
24. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 US. 617 (1961) (upholding Sunday blue law
containing numerous exceptions as applied to business selling kosher food); Green Star
Supermarkets v. Stacy, 411 S.W.2d 871 (Ark. 1967) (Upholding Sunday blue law against
contention that allowing some items to be sold but prohibiting others rendered law arbitrary).
For a discussion of the arguments for and against Sunday blue laws, see City of Mt. Vernon v.
Julian, 17 N.E.2d 52 (Il1. 1938).
25. Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 175 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. 1961).
26. See Theuman, supra note 23, at 255 (citing Vomado, Inc. v. Hyland. 390 A.2d 606
(N.J. 1978)).
27. See Mack Paramus Co. v. Mayor of Paramus, 511 A.2d 1179 (N.J. 1986) (holding
state's Sunday blue law did not preempt local Sunday closing regulation by municipality).
28. See Exparte Caldwell, 118 N.W. 133 (Neb. 1908); Exparte Kennedy, 58 S.W. 129
(Tex. Crim. App. 1900); Stark v. Backus, 123 N.W. 98 (Wis. 1909). But cf. Re Lambert [1900)
B.C. 396 (Can.) (holding ordinance preventing barbers from conducting trade on Sunday
exceeded bounds of statute giving city the authority to prohibit barbershops from staying open
on Sunday).
29. Arlan's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Kelley, 130 N.W.2d 892 (Mich. 1964) (invalidating state
law forbidding certain merchants from making sales on any successive Saturday and Sunday as
not tending to create single day of rest).
30. See State v. Smith, 143 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1965) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting
operation of clubs within 300 yards of public school or of church property after 2:00 a.m. on
Sunday because schools are not in operation during period of prohibition, churches are not open
until at least 7:00 a.m., and 300-yard classification satisfied no need); cf. Watson v. Mayor of
Thomson, 42 S.E. 747 (Ga. 1902) (holding a municipality cannot forbid carrying on of lawful
avocation on Christmas if business does not interfere with peace, good order or safety of
community. See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Validity under Establishment
of Religion Clause of Federal or State Constitution, of Provision Making Day ofReligious
Observance a Legal Holiday, 90 A.L.I.3d 752 (1979).
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unrelated to any police-power purpose, the law violates due process
requirements. 31 Both hours restrictions and Sunday laws are thus
sometimes justifiable as promoting the public health by reducing
noise.
32
IV. OTHER HEALTH-RELATED GROUNDS
Occasionally, more general grounds of protecting health are cited
in support of closing legislation, but usually without success. For
example, an ordinance requiring open-air markets to close from 7:00
p.m. until 5:00 a.m. invalidated as not lessening the dangers of dust
blowing on the food or other contamination. 33 The court remarked,
"It is difficult to conceive how any injury caused by the blowing of
dust upon the produce would be avoided or minimized by closing the
market at seven o'clock in the evening, and leaving it open during the
day. 34
Similarly, most modem cases find no valid health justification for
requiring barbershops to close in the evenings. One New Jersey
court35 observed that, at one time, barbers engaged in some forms of
medical treatment, including leechcraft and teeth extraction. Such
practices by barbers have long ceased, however, as has the presence
in barbershops of spittoons, which were known to spread contagious
diseases. The court concluded there are adequate legislative
safeguards on the practice of barbering, and the addition of closing
hour restrictions would in no way contribute to more sanitary,
healthful conditions. 3
6
31. See State v. Rockdale Associates, Inc., 218 A.2d 718 (Vt. 1966) (holding state Sunday
law allowing sale of local products but not nonlocally manufactured goods unnecessary for
general welfare and undue burden on interstate commerce).
32. On hours restrictions to reduce noise, see supra notes 6-22 and accompanying text. On
the reduction-of-noise purpose of Sunday blue laws, see Theuman, supra note 23, at 252
(noting Sunday laws have been found to have secular purpose of securing common day of rest
in order to promote public health and well-being).
33. Cowan v. City of Buffalo, 288 N.Y.S. 239 (App. Div. 1936).
34. Id. at 244.
35. Tomasi v. Township of Wayne, 313 A.2d 229, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1973).
As to barbers, see generally Validity of statute or ordinance fixing closing hours for certain
kinds ofbusiness, supra note 3, at 245.
36. Tomasi, 313 A.2d at 232-33. See generally Annotation, Validity of Statute or
Ordinance Regulating Barbers, 98 A.L.R. 1088, 1093-96 (1935).
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Courts have likewise held that closing requirements for
barbershops are not justifiable on the basis of facilitating inspections
of the shops for health purposes. Although, the need for inspection is
clear, it certainly does not have to be continuous, covering every hour
the business is open.37 One court declared, "Any regulation
compelling the opening or closing of barbershops between certain
hours because it will be inconvenient for the authorities to inspect
them-when they are open at other hours amply sufficient for such
inspection-is an unnecessary and unreasonable interference with the
operation of a lawful trade." 38 As with other regulated businesses,
barbershops cannot be forced to close merely to satisfy the
convenience of inspectors or those holding hearings on alleged
violations of the law.39 There is no sound reason for limiting
inspections, and thus the operation of the barber business, to daylight
hours since many shops are located in areas where artificial light is
always needed.40
If germs develop in the shop after the hour when inspections
cease, the delay in not detecting those germs until the next day "is not
likely to be disastrous."41 While regulation of sanitation of
barbershops and of the competence of barbers is proper, direct
legislative prescription of standards and practices that barbers must
adhere to better achieve these results than the imposition of closing
requirements that interfere with the right to make an honest living
and the convenience of customers.42 Thus, setting of opening and
closing hours for the supposed purpose of sanitation can be an
unwarranted interference with a barber's business and therefore
void.43 Evidence does not support the contention that working longer
hours, or keeping shop open for longer hours, will increase a barber's
37. People ex rel. Pinello v. Leadbitter, 85 N.Y.S.2d 287,293 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
38. Id.
39. See Ganley v. Claeys, 40 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1935).
40. See Emesti v. City of Grand Island, 251 N.W. 899, 900 (Neb. 1933).
41. Id
42. See City of Miami v. Shell's Super Store, 50 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1951) (invalidating
closing ordinance as to barbers because unrelated to health, safety or welfare of barbers or
public); cf. Chaires v. City of Atlanta, 139 S.E. 559 (Ga. 1927) (invalidating as unreasonable
night-time closing requirement for barbershops and observing that people would be unable to
obtain indispensable services of such shops if ordinance were enforced).
43. Oklahoma City v. Johnson, 82 P.2d 1057 (Okla. 1938).
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susceptibility to communicable diseases. 44 In any case, dangers
inherent in barbers working excessive hours can be dealt with by
restrictions on working hours rather than on business hours.45
Because closing regulations bear no relation to protecting the public
from disease, they are merely useless restriction on a harmless and
lawful occupation. 46 The public interest is not furthered by these
restrictions, as sanitation laws already adequately deal with possible
problems.47
On the other hand, several older decisions did find barbershop
closing-hours laws to be reasonably related to protection of public
health. One New Jersey case48 concluded that barbershops provide
particularly great opportunity for the spread of contagious diseases,
thus necessitating inspection of such shops, which may often be
inconvenient or difficult at night. The court therefore held a closing
ordinance reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.49 Relying on
that New Jersey authority, an Ohio court reached the same conclusion
regarding the validity of a barbershop closing law.50 A pair of noted
legal scholars commenting on the case declared the regulation to be
clearly within the police power. However, the state constitution gave
the legislature sole authority to restrict working hours, and therefore
municipalities lacked the power to enact such regulations.5 Ohio
courts subsequently reversed course and invalidated a municipal
44. City of Alexandria v. Hall, 131 So. 722, 724 (La. 1939) (finding closing restriction
inappropriate measure for protection of public health because public health is adequately
protected by provisions for shop inspections, instrument sterilization and testing of barbers
suspected of having communicable diseases).
45. Knight v. Johns, 137 So. 509, 510 (Miss. 1931). See State ex rel. Pavlik v. Johannes,
259 N.W. 537, 540 (Minn. 1935) (holding no limitation of business hours required as hours of
various employees can be staggered over working day so that no individual works more than
eight hours).
46. State ex rel. Newman v. City of Laramie, 275 P. 106 (Wyo. 1929) (invalidating,
without reference to constitutional provisions, closing ordinance as to barbershops as
unreasonable and thus outside municipal authority).
47. Ganley v. Claeys, 40 P.2d 817, 818 (Cal. 1935).
48. Falco v. Atlantic City, 122 A. 610 (N.J. 1923), relying on La Porta v. Board of Health,
58 A. 115 (N.J. 1904). But see modem New Jersey authority, supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
49. Falco, 122 A. at 610.
50. Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 199 N.E. 187 (Ohio 1935).
5 1. Fordham & Joe F. Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J.
18, 64 (1948).
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ordinance fixing the hours that a barbershop could remain open,
finding that the restriction made no contribution to sanitation and
that, in any case, unsanitary conditions in a barbershop are no more
likely to cause disease than similar conditions in numerous other
places of business not subject to the restrictions. 2
V. GENERAL SAFETY PURPOSES
Can a safety purpose, such as prevention of fire, justify enacting a
closing law? The general propriety of such a purpose has been
recognized as coming within the police power,53 and some cases have
found night-time fires to be a significant enough danger to support
the need for closing restrictions. Finding that laundries posed special
fire hazards, some older cases held closing requirements for laundries
justified because fires are substantially harder to fight after dark.54
Recent cases have also sometimes found a rational purpose for
limiting night-time operation of self-service laundries, due to the
possibility of fire from overloaded washers or dryers, 5 from failing
to remove lint from dryers or from putting improper materials into
them.56 So long as the ordinance is directed at time periods when fire
danger is particularly great or when fire fighting is especially
difficult, a closing ordinance may be valid.57
52. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E. 2d 412,415-16 (Ohio 1943).
53. See State v. Grant, 216 A.2d 790, 792 (N.H. 1966), relying on State v. Freeman, 38
N.H. 426 (1859) (recognizing right of municipality to set closing hours for restaurants).
54. See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885) (noting special dangers of businesses
that require fires for their operation); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885) (noting special
danger of fire in city composed largely of wooden buildings such as San Francisco); Ex parte
Moynier, 2 P. 728 (Cal. 1884). But see Yee Gee v. City of San Francisco, 235 F. 757 (N.D. Cal.
1916) (finding a closing ordinance as to all laundries throughout San Francisco too extreme to
be justified by fire hazard). See generally Annotation, Validity of statute or ordinance fixing
closing hours for certain kinds of business, supra note 3, at 245-47.
55. See Township of Little Falls v. Husni, 352 A.2d 595, 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. app. Div.
1976), distinguishing Fasino v. Montvale Mayor & Council, 300 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1973), affd, 324 A.2d 77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (invalidating as too extreme
ordinance requiring closing of nearly all businesses during certain hours but noting special
dangers of laundries).
56. Gibbons v. City of Chicago, 214 N.E.2d 740,743 (IIl. 1966).
57. See Spann v. Gaither, 136 A. 41, 43-44 (Md. 1927) (invalidating portion of ordinance
regarding laundries that prohibited operation between midnight Sunday and 6:00 a.m. Monday
as no special danger was shown to exist during that time).
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Courts have similarly upheld closing ordinances for drugstores
where aimed at the danger of mishandling prescription drugs. 8 On
the other hand, just as most cases find no special health-related
reasons to limit the hours of barbershops there are in general no
special safety considerations regarding drugstores either.6
0
VI. CRIME CONTROL
One specific safety consideration to which courts give great
deference, and which has at times been held to justify closing laws
even as to barbershops, is the protection of the community from
crime. According to one court, "often in our cities the barber shop in
front may be a blind for a den of thieves, professional gamblers, and
racketeers behind,"61 justifying restrictions on night-time operation of
such businesses. While the attitude toward barbershops in this regard
has largely changed,62 the general rule remains that night-time
closing of businesses whose operation at such hours could reasonably
be thought to endanger the maintenance of order and the protection of
persons and property may be necessary.63 Thus, restaurants may be
forced to close at midnight when they have been the site of assaults
and other disturbances.64
Courts have recognized that "the lawless element" often gathers
around pool and billiard halls, making it reasonable for a city to
require their night-time closure.65 A requirement that pool rooms
close as early as 7:00 p.m. has been upheld as validly contributing to
58. Spiro Drug Serv., Inc. v. Board of Commissioner of Union City, 130 N.J.L. 1 (1943).
59. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
60. See City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412, 415 (Ohio 1943).
61. Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 199 N.E. 187, 191-92 (Ohio 1935).
62. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
63. See State v. Grant, 216 A.3d 790 (N.H. 1966) (upholding closing ordinance applicable
to all restaurants as helping maintain order and protect persons and property).
64. Id. See also Churchill v. City of Albany, 133 P. 632 (Or. 1913) (discussing ordinance
requiring restaurants and various other establishments to close between midnight and 5:00 a.m.
to forestall sale of intoxicating liquor disguised as soft drinks); City of Burlington v. Jay Lee,
Inc., 290 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1972) (upholding ordinance prohibiting operation of establishments
dispensing food and drink during early morning hours as necessary to maintain order).
65. Exparte Brewer, 152 S.W. 1068, 1069 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) (sustaining ordinance
requiring pool halls to close from midnight until 5:00 a.m.).
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the public peace and general welfare.66 The tendency of these
businesses to contribute to idleness, gambling and the commission of
crimes supports the validity of closing laws.67 Even total bans on pool
rooms have occasionally been upheld,68 and therefore a fortiori, the
hours.69
Courts uphold night-time closing requirements for massage
parlors and bathhouses, as a reasonable exercise of the police power
because of the reputation of these establishments as places where
lewd and immoral acts are likely to occur.70 Adult bookstores may be
similarly regarded. 71 Even self-service laundries may be validly
considered places in which crime is especially likely to occur after
dark and may therefore be required either to have an attendant on
duty or to close during night-time hours. 2 Indeed, automated
laundries may be required to close altogether during particularly
dangerous periods, without regard to whether or not they keep an
attendant on duty.73 Because the peak of criminal activity often
occurs during certain night-time hours, even the maintenance of an
66. Purvis v. City of Ocilla, 102 S.E. 241 (Ga. 1920) (upholding ordinance prohibiting
pool rooms from being kept open between 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.).
67. City of Tarkio v. Cook, 25 S.V. 202, 203 (Mo. 1894) (upholding ordinance under
which billiard halls could not be kept open after 9:00 p.m.).
68. See State ex rel. Baylor v. City of Hinton, 155 S.E. 912 (,V. Va. 1930) (discussing
validity of city policy of prohibiting pool rooms and city's rejection of all applications for such
licenses).
69. See Cook, 25 S.W. at 203 (noting that Missouri statutory law would allow villages to
prohibit billiard halls altogether).
70. City of Spokane v. Bostrom, 528 P.2d 500, 501 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding
ordinance that prohibited conducting massage parlor or bathhouse business between 10:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m. to be reasonable exercise of police power).
71. See Star Satellite, Inc. v. City of Biloxi, 779 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding
ordinance limiting bookstore operations to hours of 10:00 a.m. to midnight Mondays through
Saturdays).
72. Township of Little Falls v. Husni, 352 A.2d 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976 (self-
service laundry could not operate between midnight and 7:00 a.m. without attendant on duty).
73. Schacht v. City of New York, 219 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1961), modified, 14 A.D.2d
526, 217 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1961) (upholding provisions requiring automatic or coin-operated
laundries to close between midnight and 6:00 a.m. and requiring coin-operated laundries to
have attendant on the premises between 6:00 p.m. and midnight). The court observed that even
the presence of an attendant can be regarded as an insufficient safeguard after midnight because
there are very few pedestrians on the street at that hour, and the presence of an attendant during
early morning hours would tend to encourage crimes outside the laundromat by persons who
would lie in wait for those emerging from the establishment. 219 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
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attendant may not be a sufficient safeguard at such times.74 Not only
the theft of coins from the laundry machines, but also sex crimes
ranging from exhibitionism to rape are likely to decrease if
laundromats are required to close at night.75 Self-service car washes
may be similarly restricted if they become, or have the potential to
become, the site of rowdiness and gang activity. 76 Even service
stations may be restricted to day-time operation where empirical
evidence shows that most crimes committed at such businesses occur
at night.77
In some instances, night-time business activity may increase the
opportunity for fraud, and laws that prohibit such activity from
occurring under cover of darkness may thus be valid. Jewelry
auctions have often been ruled validly subject to regulations
forbidding nocturnal operation.78  Some empirical evidence
demonstrates that the sale of diamonds, watches, and other jewelry
under artificial light results in deception of, and fraud on, the public,
thus justifying prohibitions on night-time sales.79 Courts have taken
judicial notice that the genuineness of such articles as jewelry "is
more readily determined by the light of day than by artificial light." '
Modem improvements in artificial lighting have not reduced the need
for restrictions on night time sales of jewelry, because lights are
adjustable and technology has also facilitated the manufacture of
seeminly authentic imitation jewelry.8' Similarly, restrictions on
74. Id. See generally Annotation, License, regulation, and taxation of self-service
laundries, 87 A.L.R.2d 1007, 1011-14 (1963).
75. Gibbons v. City of Chicago, 214 N.E.2d 740, 744 (111. 1966).
76. People v. Raub, 155 N.W.2d 848 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (ordinance forbidding coin-
operated self-service car washes from being kept open between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.
upheld as reasonable exercise of police power).
77. See Bi-Lo Stations, Inc. v. Village of Alsip, 318 N.E.2d 47 (111. App. Ct. 1974) (ruling
that village ordinance providing that gasoline stations could be operated only between 6:00 a.m.
and midnight was constitutional exercise of police power reasonably related to deterrence of
crime and criminal activity in village).
78. See Davidson v. Phelps, 107 So. 86 (Ala. 1926); Clein v. City of Atlanta, 139 S.E. 46
(Ga. 1927); Wagman v. City of Trenton, 134 A. 115 (N.J. 1926); Biddies v. Enright, 146 N.E.
625 (N.Y. 1926); Alexander v. Enright, 206 N.Y.S. 785 (App. Div. 1924); City of Roanoke v.
Fisher, 119 S.E. 259 (Va. 1923).
79. See Fisher, 119 S.E. at 262.
80. Davidson, 107 So. at 88.
81. See Biddles, 146 N.E. at 628.
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after-dark operation of pawnshops 82 and second-hand stores83 have
been upheld in order to reduce the possibility of fraudulent sales.
Here, there is the additional reason that such establishments are used
by thieves for the disposal of stolen goods, and night-time restrictions
on second-hand businesses may therefore help curtail night-time
theft.8
4
However, not all night-time closing laws have been found
sustainable on the ground of reducing criminal activity. A New
Jersey case85 found no public need to legislate the night-time closing
of convenience stores and gas stations, since evidence showed that
robberies and other criminal acts at these businesses could occur at
any time of day or night. Another New Jersey case concluded that the
perception of barbershops as breeding grounds of crime is an
outdated holdover from Shakespeare's day, and thus there is no need
to require night-time closing of such businesses in a peaceful, well-lit
shopping area.86 It has been recognized that barbering today cannot
reasonably be regarded as a noxious business that attracts loafers and
derelicts to its places of operation.87 Likewise, some courts have not
been persuaded that allowing a self-service laundry to remain open
after dark will encourage prowlers to commit crimes88 or will make
the maintaining of law and order so difficult as to justify closing an
82. Solofv. City of Chattanooga, 174 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1943), reh. denied, 176 S.W.2d
816 (1944) (upholding ordinance restricting pawnbrokers hours to 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.
from June to September, and until 7:00 p.m. from October to May).
83. Hyman v. Boldrick, 154 SAV. 369 (Ky. 1913) (upholding ordinance requiring second-
hand dealers to keep their stores closed from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.). Cf. City of Butte v.
Paltrovich, 75 P. 521 (Mont. 1904) (upholding ordinance designed to ensure that pawnshops
and second-hand stores conduct business during daylight hours).
84. See Hyman, 154 S.W. at 370.
85. Southland Corp. v. Township of Edison, 524 A.2d 1336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div.
1986).
86. Tomasi v. Township of Wayne, 313 A.2d 229, 233-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div.
1973) (quoting Shakespeare's MEASURE FOR MEASURE on laxity of law enforcement as to
barbershops in earlier times, but concluding that this was not the current situation in Wayne
Township, New Jersey because "Peace reigns in Wayne.").
87. See Oklahoma City v. Johnson, 82 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Okla. 1938).
88. Van Sciver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 152 A.2d 717, 723 (Pa. 1959) (finding
zoning board acted improperly in requiring, as condition for granting permit to coin-operated
laundromat, that business hours be limited to 8:00 am. through 8:00 p.m. Monday through
Saturday). But see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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otherwise lawful business.8 9 In general, however, courts have been
quite willing to accept a legislative determination that closing laws
will reduce crime and contribute to maintaining the peace. Such a
purpose is well-established as a potentially valid one for the
enactment of a closing law. All that is then required to uphold the
validity of a specific law is evidence from which reasonable people
could determine that crime-fighting will be aided by the closing
requirement.
90
VII. LIQUOR CONTROL
One particular area of crime control relevant to closing legislation
is enforcement of the liquor laws. It has been recognized that liquor
presents special dangers: "Liquor itself is regarded as an evil, an
enemy of civilization and of good government."91 These dangers in
turn may justify special closing restrictions, otherwise unsupportable
under any police-power purpose, where the sale or dispensing of
ordinary items is concerned. 92 Thus, a law requiring night-time
closing of bars or liquor stores may be upheld, even if it would be
invalid when applied to grocery or clothing stores.93
The dangers of liquor may even justify a closing requirement for
establishments selling soft drinks or other bottled goods, because the
legislative body may reasonably fear that these goods are "not as
'soft' as the unsophisticated may believe them to be." 94 An ordinance
may thus validly require night-time closing of restaurants, and even
of catering services, in order to prevent sub rosa sale of intoxicating
89. See Fasino v. Mayor of Montvale, 300 A.2d 195 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1973),
aft d, 324 A.2d 77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (invalidating ordinance requiring closing of
all businesses, except those limited to on-premises consumption of food and/or beverages,
between 11:00 p.m. and 6:30 a.m.; cf. Heard v. Bolton, 131 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963);
City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847 (Ry. 1944) (concluding that
added expense of night-time policing due to businesses remaining open after dark did not
justify closing requirement).
90. See supra notes 61-84 and accompanying text.
91. State v. Ray, 42 S.E. 960, 961 (N.C. 1902).
92. Seeid.at961.
93. Id. As to mercantile establishments, see generally Validity of statute or ordinance
fixing closing hours for certain kinds of business, supra note 3, at 247-49.
94. Churchill v. City of Albany, 133 P. 632, 633 (Or. 1913).
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drinks.95 Legislative bodies typically have very broad power over the
regulation of liquor, and an exercise of such power through
enactment of a closing restriction will generally be upheld unless
there is a clear abuse of legislative discretion.96 Because, however,
the authority to control liquor resides initially in the state,97 a
municipality's power can only derive from a state statute delegating
that power 98 or from some provision of a home-rule city's charter.99
VIII. INVALID PURPOSES
There are thus a number of valid purposes connected to public
health and safety-and, to a lesser extent, connected to morality and
general welfare-justifying enactment of closing legislation. What
purposes have been specifically recognized by the courts as
improper? Courts have invalidated closing legislation that, with
nothing more than a reference to general welfare, requires the night-
time closing of all or most businesses.100 A closing restriction must be
justified by specific dangers or conditions, otherwise it is an
unwarranted interference with the right of citizens to earn a living.' 0'
95. Id. But see Fincher v. City of Union, 196 S.E. 1 (S.C. 1938) (noting that direct
regulation of noise and nuisance problems preferable to closing restrictions on restaurants). See
generally Carmichael, supra note 6, at 944-45.
96. See Other Place of Miami, Inc. v. City of Hialeah Gardens, 353 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (upholding city ordinance changing required closing time for retail vendors of
alcoholic beverages from 3:00 a.m. to 1:00 am.).
97. See Los Angeles Brewing Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 48 P.2d 71 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1935) (holding state had exclusive right to license liquor dealers for revenue; city could not
impose license tax); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. MeClain, 422 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1967) (holding sale of
liquor was reserved for state regulation and city zoning ordinance restricting sale of beer
invalid). Thus, if there is a conflict between state and local law-even the law of a home-rule
city-as to liquor, the state law will always prevail. See Williams v. City of Jackson, 164
N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Comm. P1. 1959) (holding city could not forbid sale of beer during hours
when state allowed beer sales); Sparger v. Harris, 131 P.2d 1011 (Okla. 1942) (holding city
could not prohibit Sunday sale of beer when sale was authorized by state statute). See generally
REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 539-4 1.
98. See Other Place ofMiami, 353 So.2d at 861 (upholding restriction on hours of sale for
alcoholic beverages as permissible under state statute).
99. See State v. Ray, 42 S.E. 960, 961 (N.C. 1902) (noting that town charters generally
give power to regulate establishments where liquor is sold).
100. See Exparte Harrell, 79 So. 166 (Fla. 1918).
101. See Yee Gee v. City of San Francisco, 235 F. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1916) (invalidating
ordinance forbidding laundries from washing or performing other work between 6:00 p.m. and
7:00 a.m. as unreasonable interference with liberty of persons pursuing legitimate occupation).
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Laws cannot validly require night-time closing on the basis of risks
or problems that exist equally during the daytime.
102
Beyond that, the courts have singled-out a few specific purposes
as improper and inappropriate grounds for closing requirements. In
general, a municipality cannot restrict business hours merely to save
the government or its workers time or money. 10 3 For example, courts
have held that limitations on opening hours cannot be fixed for the
convenience of the authorities charged with inspecting the
businesses.1l 4 So long as the businesses are open sufficient hours to
make inspection reasonably possible, the public is adequately
protected, and further restriction is unnecessary. 0 5 In many cities,
inspectors of some businesses are not on duty for long periods of
time; thus, to require the closing of those businesses whenever the
inspectors are unavailable would cause severe inconvenience to both
workers and customers. 106 Adequate provision for inspection, and for
health regulation in general, is attainable without severely limiting
the hours that a business remains open, 10 7 thereby preventing the
financial losses that such limitations might unnecessarily cause some
establishments.1
0 8
102. See Van Sciver v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 152 A.2d 717, 723 (Pa. 1959) (holding
limitation on hours of coin-operated laundromat not justified on basis of machines emitting
odors or fumes or because unsavory characters might congregate in such places, as these
dangers were equally present during daytime and night).
103. See City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1944)
(holding mere fact that city might incur additional expense in policing town at night invalid
reason for ordinance requiring all businesses to close between midnight and 4:00 a.m.).
104. Justesen's Food Stores, Inc. v. City of Tulare, 84 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1938) (holding
city could not require establishments dealing in foods to close at certain times merely for
convenience of inspectors); Skaggs v. City of Oakland, 57 P.2d 478, 480 (Cal. 1936)
(invalidating ordinance restricting deliveries of bakery goods to times when inspectors might
reasonably be expected to be on duty). See People ex rel. Pinello v. Leadbitter, 85 N.Y.S.2d
287, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (holding closing restriction on barbershops unnecessary and
unreasonable interference with lawful business if restriction based on convenience of
inspectors).
105. See Knight v. Johns, 137 So. 509 (1931) (holding policy of fixing reasonable time for
inspecting shops invalid ground for ordinance forbidding barbershops to open before 7:30 a.m.
or remain open after 6:30 p.m.).
106. City of Denver v. Schmid, 52 P.2d 388, 389 (Colo. 1935).
107. See Ganley v. Claeys, 40 P.2d 817, 818 (Cal. 1935) (finding state laws provided
complete plan for regulation of barbering business, infrequent inspections did not detract from
effectiveness of available process for handling complaints).
108. See McCulley v. City of Wichita, 98 P.2d 192, 196198 (Kan. 1940) (invalidating
ordinance restricting food sales to hours convenient for food inspectors as not substantially
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Regulation of sanitary conditions at places of business is a proper
and necessary government activity, but it does not in itself justify
closing restrictions.109 Night-time operation of businesses such as
barbershops might historically have contributed to unhealthy
conditions, but this is no longer the case.110 Furthermore, in
accordance with the general rule requiring benefit to the public rather
than the government,'' the increased costs, if any, of inspections that
result from longer business hours cannot justify a closing law,
especially since the government can recover the costs by imposing
license fees.12
Courts have also specifically held that providing employees with
shorter working hours is not a valid justification for closing
legislation."l 3 Restrictions on working hours for employees such as
barbers may be reasonably related to public health and safety, but
such measures "can only be effectual as health or safety measures if
limited to the number of hours per day or per week that the individual
barber is permitted to work."'14 Employees at many businesses work
in shifts, thus minimizing the dangers of any individual employee
working too long and limiting the need for limitations on business
hours."15
related to public health and general welfare when enforcement would cause some sellers to
suffer financial losses or close their businesses).
109. See City of Miami v. Shell's Super Store, 50 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1951) (finding
regulation of barbers should deal with competence and sanitation and protection of public from
disease and holding restriction on barbershop hours unrelated to these goals); cf. Oklahoma City
v. Johnson, 82 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Okla. 1938) (holding wages and hours of labor of barbers and
sanitary conditions under proper subjects of regulation which they work, but it does not follow
that these purposes justify regulation of the opening and closing hours of barbershops).
110. Tomasi v. Township of Wayne, A.2d 229,232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1973).
111. See Cowan v. City of Buffalo, 288 N.Y.S. 239, 246 (App. Div. 1936) (invalidating
hours restriction on open-air markets as conferring no legitimate benefit on the public).
112. State ex rel. Newman v. City of Laramie, 275 P. 106, 110 (Vyo. 1929) (reasonable to
suppose that legislature, in granting cities power to license and regulate barbershops, intended
that expense of inspection be covered by license fees or borne by public); cf. McDermott v. City
of Seattle, 4 F. Supp. 855, 857 (W.D. Wash. 1933) (holding city may not enact ordinance
depriving barbershop owner of goodwill generated during 25 years of operation without
providing compensation, because goodwill is a vested property right).
113. See State ex rel. Pavlik v. Johannes, 259 N.W. 537, 540-41 (Minn. 1935) (holding
closing law for barbershops unconstitutional and declaring that closing law did not assist in
achieving shorter working hours for employees).
114. People ex rel. Pinello v. Leadbitter, 85 N.Y.S.2d 287,293 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
115. City of Denver v. Schmid, 52 P.2d 388, 389 (Colo. 1935).
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Similarly, it is not a proper purpose of municipal regulation to
give relief to business operators who do not want to remain open 24
hours a day but must do so, as some gas station operators are, by
agreements with their franchisers.1 16 Nor is it the function of the
municipality to pass a closing law merely to protect business
operators from a competitor who is willing to stay open longer
hours."17 There must be some public benefit, which certainly does not
flow from limiting competition.
Just as the possible additional cost of inspections does not justify a
closing law," s the additional expense of policing the city at night
because businesses remain open is not a sufficient reason to sustain a
closing requirement." 9 One of the principal duties of government is
to provide protection against crime, and the government cannot force
lawful businesses to close on the basis that additional resources will
otherwise have to be spent to supply adequate protection.
120
Furthermore, closing requirements for harmless businesses such as
barbershops cannot be upheld on the ground that they provide places
where crimes are particularly likely to occur, thus making
enforcement of criminal laws more difficult.' 21 While it may be true
that policing the city would be easier if all places of business, or at
least all unattended businesses, were required to close at dark, but
this does not justify the resulting inconvenience to customers and loss
of patronage to owners of such an extreme measure. 122 Laws should
deal directly with the harmful conduct that the lawmakers desire to
prevent, rather than indirectly approaching the problem by requiring
116. Southland Corp. v. Township of Edison, 524 A.2d 1336, 1347-48 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law. Div. 1986) (holding ordinance requiring closing of convenience food stores during certain
hours unconstitutional).
117. State v. Ray, 42 S.E. 960, 961 (N.C. 1902) (holding no legislative power exists to pass
ordinance interfering with personal liberty by compelling unwilling merchant to close at 7:30
p.m). Cf City of Buffalo v. Linsman, 98 N.Y.S. 737, 738 (App. Div. 1906) (invalidating
ordinance prohibiting produce peddling in streets between 5:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. as
improperly compelling customers to patronize grocers and shopkeepers).
118. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
119. City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky. 1944).
120. See Fasino v. Mayor of Montvale, 300 A.2d 195, 202-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div.
1973), aft'd, 324 A.2d 77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
121. Chaires v. City of Atlanta, 139 S.E. 559, 561 (Ga. 1927) (finding closing ordinance
for barbershops unreasonable).
122. See Heard v. Bolton, 131 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963).
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basically beneficial establishments to close merely because criminal
conduct may sometimes occur there. Thus, for example, laws cannot
require picture arcades to close at night in order to prevent
masturbation by their customers.
23
IX. EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
Due process arguments that result in the invalidation of a closing
law not reasonably related to a police-power purpose overlap with
equal protection arguments that invalidate closing restrictions which
unreasonably discriminate against some businesses. Thus, when a
closing restriction targets particular businesses, such as barbershops it
may not only lack a valid purpose, but may also violate equal
protection principles. 24 If, for instance, a law prohibits barbershops
from night-time operation, but fails to place similar restrictions on
beauty shops, it is likely to be ruled arbitrary and unreasonably
discriminatory. 2 5  Similarly, a court invalidates an ordinance
regulating the hours during which grocery stores may sell food, but
exempting from the regulation the sale of food prepared on a
business's premises for immediate consumption. 26 A closing law that
singles-out shoe stores is also highly suspect,l1 7 as is a law that
applies only to "lunch wagons" and not to restaurants.12 8 Courts have
123. People v. Glaze, 614 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1980) (invalidating ordinance requiring picture
arcades to close between hours of 2:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. as unnecessary to legitimate
governmental interest of preventing masturbation by customers and declaring ordinance should
deal directly with objectionable conduct).
124. See Chaires, 139 S.E. 561,563.
125. See City of Denver v. Schmid, 52 P.2d 388, 389 (Colo. 1935); Emesti v. City of
Grand Island, 251 N.W. 899 (Neb. 1933) (invalidating as unreasonably discriminatory closing
laws that applied to barbershops but not beauty shops). But see State ex rel. Melton v. Nolan, 30
S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. 1930) (upholding discriminatory closing law); Gerard v. Smith, 52 S.W.2d
347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (upholding discriminatory closing law). See generally Annotation,
Validity ofStatute or Ordinance Regulating Barbers, supra note 36, at 1090-91.
126. McCulley v. City of Wichita, 98 P.2d 192, 197-98 (Kan. 1940).
127. See Dave Abrams, Inc. v. City of Buffalo, 228 N.Y.S. 239 (1945), a/fd 12 N.E.2d
174, 175 (N.Y. 1937).
128. See Hart v. Teaneck Township, 50 A.2d 856 (NJ. 1947) (holding closing ordinance
limited to lunch wagons unreasonably discriminatory because lunch wagons do not differ
substantially from restuarants). As to distinctions among various kinds of eating establishments,
see generally What Constitutes a "Restaurant," supra note 6, at 1399. See also What Amounts
to "Restaurant" or "Restaurant Business" Within Intoxicating Liquor Law, supra note 6, at
428.
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also held that there is no reason for a closing law to set different
business hours for masseurs who operate as single practitioners than
for massage parlors in which two or more masseurs practice. 129 A
closing law that applies generally to retail stores, but exempts drug
stores, delicatessens, and a wide variety of other retail businesses, has
been held "clearly discriminatory." 130  Similarly, a closing
requirement applicable to commercial establishments that exempts
drug stores and dealers in perishable necessities, but does not restrict
the exempted businesses to the sale of drugs or perishable necessities
during the hours when other businesses must close, has been found to
involve improper favoritism.'
31
Closing laws that exempt, or apply different standards to, some
businesses may be valid if there is good reason for the disparate
treatment. Thus, a general closing requirement may exempt
restaurants on the ground that food is a necessity. 32 Courts may
uphold more stringent restrictions on pawnshops than on other
businesses because pawnshops facilitate the commission of crime and
its concealment. 133 Indeed, this special treatment may apply to all
dealers in second-hand goods.134 Laws may validly restrict auction
Courts have also invalidated Sunday blue laws as discriminating without good reason
against certain businesses. See Allen v. Colorado Springs, 75 P.2d 141 (Colo. 1938)
(invalidating closing law that applied to grocery stores but not retail drugstores or certain other
businesses as discriminatory); Kislingbury v. Treasurer, 160 A. 654 (N.J.C.P. 1932) (holding
ordinance excepting sale of milk and medicine from Sabbath restrictions); Exparte Hodges, 83
P.2d 201 (Okla. Crim. App. 1938) (holding ordinance applicable only to certain businesses such
as grocery stores unconstitutional). See generally Annotation, Constitutionality of
Discrimination by Sunday Law or Ordinance as Between Different Kinds of Business, 119
A.L RI 752 (1939).
129. Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 (Utah 1978).
130. Crawford's Clothes, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 35 A.2d 38, 38-39 (N.J. 1944)
(finding no reasonable basis was shown "to prohibit the sale of clothing and permit the sale of
stationery supplies, to prohibit the sale of shoes and permit the sale of gasoline, to prohibit the
sale of hats and permit the sale of liquor.").
131. Saville v. Corless, 151 P. 51,52 (Utah 1915).
132. See Opyt's Amoco, Inc. v. Village of South Holland, 486-87, 568 N.E.2d 260, 268
(111. App. Ct. 1991), ajfld 595 N.E.2d 1060 (I11. 992) (upholding constitutionality of village's
Sunday closing ordinance and indicating that test for validity of treating businesses differently
is whether invidious discrimination is present).
133. See City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 75 P. 521 (Mont. 1904); Solofv. City of Chattanooga,
174 S.W.2d 471,472 (Tenn. 1943).
134. See Hyman v. Boldrick, 154 S.W. 369, 370 (Ky. 1913) (finding ordinance requiring
all second-hand dealers to close their stores from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. nondiscriminatory and
based on a reasonable classification).
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sales of diamonds, watches and jewelry due to the strong possibilities
of deception and fraud when such goods are sold under artificial
lights.1 35 Consequently, courts may find the restriction reasonable
even if it applies to all sales ofjewelry1 36
Dealers in intoxicating liquors, both at wholesale and retail levels,
can be subject to special closing requirements due to the dangers
inherent in the use of these products. 137 Closing requirements may
legitimately discriminate between places of business, such as
restaurants, that sell intoxicating liquors and restaurants not engaging
in the sale of liquor.138 The presence of liquor on the premises and the
acquisition of a liquor license are sufficient factors to distinguish
businesses from establishments where liquor is not available. Even
the sale of soft drinks or bottled goods may be a sufficient basis
imposition of a special closing requirement. 39 Similarly, businesses
that sell sexually-explicit materials may be subject to regulations on
hours of operation that do not apply to other establishments, because
of the unique and significant community interests at stake.1 40 Places
of business where criminal elements are reasonably likely to gather,
such as billiard halls, 141 or places where robberies and other crimes
are especially likely to occur, such as service stations,142 may be
forced to close at night. Laws may also restrict the hours of
135. City of Roanoke v. Fisher, 119 S.E. 259,263 (Va. 1923).
136. Davidson v. Phelps, 107 So. 86, 88 (Ala. 1926) (noting that courts have taken judicial
notice of fact that public are expecially susceptible to deception in sale of merchandise from
jewelry stock and that genuineness is more easily assessed in daylight than by artificial light).
137. See State v. Calloway, 84 P. 27, 32 (Idaho 1906) (liquor trade as a whole subject to
different laws and regulations than other business because of public health and moral
implications).
138. Cowan v. City of St. Petersburg, 6 So.2d 269, 271 (Fla. 1942) (upholding ordinance
requiring restaurant licensed to sell alcoholic beverages to close, where same restriction did not
apply to restaurants without a liquor license).
139. See Churchill v. City of Albany, 133 P. 632, 633 (Or. 1913) (finding city council
could reasonably believe that compelling sellers of soft drinks to close at midnight promoted
good government).
140. See Star Satellite, Inc. v. City of Biloxi, 779 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1986).
141. See City ofTarkio v. Cook, 25 S.W. 202, 203 (Mo. 1984) (ordinance required billiard
halls had to close at 9:00 p.m.).
142. See Bi-Lo Stations, Inc. v. Village of Alsip, 318 N.E.2d 47 (ll. App. Ct. 1974)
(finding ordinance requiring service stations to close between midnight and 6:00 a.m.
reasonably related to deterrence of crime). But see Southland Corp. v. Township of Edison, 524
A.2d 1336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1986) (holding closing ordinance as applied to gasoline
stations violated constitutional rights of citizens to acquire, possess and protect property).
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businesses that have a history of causing loud noise and disturbing
neighbors, even if the business is as seemingly innocuous as a car
wash. 143 Similarly, restrictions may limit restaurants to certain hours
of business because of their potential for producing noise,' 44
particularly if the restriction applies only to hours when it is
commonly known that most people are attempting to rest.
145
A closing law applicable to businesses that may be validly
regulated can be invalid if its limitations are unreasonably
discriminatory. Thus, a court invalidated an ordinance allowing
service stations to sell gasoline to common carriers, but prohibiting
sales to private persons during certain hours, on the ground that the14 6 A n
two different kinds of sales did not present different hazards. An
ordinance specifically limiting laundry operations on Monday
mornings has been found unreasonable, 147 as has an ordinance
applicable only to barbecue stands and not to other eating
establishments. 48 A law is not necessarily invalid merely because
only one particular type of business currently comes within its terms
if those terms are of general application. 149 If, however, a disturbance
to the community results purely from the manner in which one
particular establishment is being conducted, rather than from the
intrinsic nature of a class of businesses, the law of nuisance may
provide the appropriate means of dealing with the problem.15
0
143. See People v. Raub, 155 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (upholding closing
restrictions on car wash resulting from reports of loud noise, beer drinking and disturbances at
establishment).
144. See State v. Grant, 216 A.2d 790, 791-92 (N.H. 1966) (upholding ordinance requiring
restaurants to closed between midnight and 6:00 am.). See generally Validity of Municipal
Ordinance Regulating Time During Which Restaurant Business May Be Conducted, supra note
6, at 944-45. However, restaurants may also be exempted from closing restrictions on the
ground that the service they provide is a necessity. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
145. See City of Burlington, v. Jay Lee, Inc., 290 A.2d 23, 26 (Vt. 1972).
146. Heil v. Kaufman, 189 S.W.2d 276,278 (Mo. 1945).
147. Spann v. Gaither, 136 A. 41 (Md. 1927).
148. Fincherv. City of Union, 196 S.E. 1 (S.C. 1938).
149. Township of Little Falls v. Husni, 352 A.2d 595, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(upholding ordinance of general application to laundromats, even though it affected only
defendant's business).
150. See Fincher, 196 S.E. 3, 5 (holding ordinance prohibiting operation of barbecue stand
in residential area of city during certain hours not justified by particular stands partially causing
nuisance).
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X. FORMS OF REGULATION
In enacting a closing restriction, a municipal legislative body is
acting under the police power delegated by the state. 151 Enactments
may take different forms and involve different aspects of the police
power. Some are simply broad exercises of that power based on the
city's wide authority "to determine not only what the public interest
and welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure such
interests.'' 2 Often, municipalities enact regulations of business,
including closing regulations, as part of a general program for
licensing businesses in order to protect public health, safety, morality
and general welfare. 53 Sometimes, a closing regulation may rely on a
more specific provision of the police power, such as the authority to
control the liquor trade. 5 4 While in some jurisdictions the state
government has completely preempted the power to control the hours
for selling liquor, in other states the laws leave room for further
municipal restrictions, or even specifically provide municipalities
with authority in this area.' 55 Therefore, the validity of municipal
regulation of liquor sales is largely a matter between the state and the
municipality; the basic power to restrict the hours of such sales is
well established, 56 including the power to limit sales at restaurants
and other businesses whose trade is not limited to liquor.
157
151. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
152. Bi-Lo Stations, Inc. v. Village of Alsip, 318 N.E.2d 47, 50 (III. App. Ct. 1974)
(quoting Tometz v. Board of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ill. 1968)).
153. See David E. Shelton Prod., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 520 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (I11. App.
Ct. 1988) (upholding conditional license for juice bar that restricted licensee from operating
during early morning hours).
154. See State v. Calloway, 84 P. 27, 29 (Idaho 1906) (noting that city charter gave council
power to enact ordinances and make regulations governing sale of intoxicating liquors).
155. See generally REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 539-41; Frank D. Wagner, Annotation,
Validity of Municipal Regulation More Restrictive Than State Regulation as to Tine for Selling
or Serving Intoxicating Liquor, 51 A.L.R.3d 1061, 1063-64 (1973). See Other Place of Miami,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah Gardens, 353 So.2d 861, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that
state statute permitted municipal regulation of sales hours for alcoholic beverages).
156. See Mallon v. Commonwealth, 98 S.W. 315 (Ky. 1906) (upholding conviction for
violation of law restricting liquor sales where defendant had barroom partitioned from rest of
premises, and opened entire premises during prohibited hours, even though defendant did not
sell liquor).
157. See Cowan v. City of St. Petersburg, 6 So.2d 269, 271 (Fla. 1942) (upholding
ordinance requiring restaurant that sold liquor be fully closed and not serve meals during hours
when other restaurants were allowed to operate); State v. Gerhardt, 44 N.E. 469, 477 (Ind.
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Occasionally, zoning laws which themselves are always exercises
of the police power contain closing restrictions. 5 8 Thus, the city's
interest in protecting the welfare of its neighborhoods may justify
limits on the hours of operation of adult businesses located in certain
areas of the city. 159 The restrictions may take the form of conditions
attached to special permits, such as exceptions or variances, that
allow a business to operate in a zone where it is ordinarily
prohibited. 6° However, granting a variance or other special
permission does not preclude a city from also applying closing
regulations of general application to the establishment.
161
Restaurants 162 and laundries11 3 are examples of businesses that
sometimes are subject to hours restrictions included within the
applicable zoning laws.
1896) (upholding statute providing that any room where intoxicating liquors sold must be
locked, and all persons excluded therefrom, during hours when sale of liquor prohibited); cf.
Orme v. Mayor of Tuscumbia, 43 So. 584 (Ala. 1907) (upholding ordinance interpreted as
requiring liquor dealer to close any part of premises used for retailing business on Sunday). See
generally Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statute or Ordinance
Requiring Closing, During Certain Hours, of Places Where Intoxicating Liquor Is Sold, as
Affected by Fact that Such Places Are Also Used for Other Business, 139 A.L.R. 756 (1942).
158. As to the recognition and development of zoning as an exercise of the police power,
see REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 354-62.
159. See Star Satellite, Inc v. City of Biloxi, 779 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1986) ("A
community's interest in furthering the welfare of its neighborhoods justifies its regulation of
sexually explicit commercial speech so long as such regulation is restricted to protect
designated neighborhoods justifiably and does not constitute a broad ban on the availability of
such material throughout the community.").
160. See Montgomery County v. Mossburg, 180 A.2d 851 (Md. 1962) (holding 11:00 p.m.
closing requirement proper condition of special exception for enlargement of restaurant). See
generally Annotation, Imposing Restrictions as to Hours or Days of Operation of Business as
Condition ofAllowance of Special Zoning Exception or Variance, 99 A.L.R.2d 227 (1965).
161. City of Burlington v. Jay Lee, Inc., 290 A.2d 23, 26 (Vt. 1972) (finding not estopped
from applying closing law to restaurant even though restaurant granted variance with no closing
restrictions attached).
162. Id. See generally Annotation, Zoning Regulations as Forbidding or Restricting
Restaurants, Diners, "Drive-ins, " or the Like, 82 A.L.RI2d 989 (1962).
163. See State ex rel. 12501 Superior Corp. v. City of East Cleveland, 158 N.E.2d 565, 569
(Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (holding Sunday closing restriction properly imposed as condition on
permit for laundry in area where such use not allowed as matter of right). But see Van Sciver v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 152 A.2d 717, 723 (Pa. 1959) (holding conditioning issuance of use
permit for laundromat on closing the operation at night and on Sunday improper). See generally
Annotation, License, Regulation, and Taxation of Self-Service Laundries, 87 A.L.R.2d 1007
(1963).
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XI. LoCAL V. STATE REGULATION
Because all closing restrictions are exercises of the police
power-regardless of whether they are enacted as general welfare
measures or more specifically as liquor-control or zoning measures-
municipalities only have the power to enact these laws if the state
expressly or impliedly confers it.164 A delegation of power from the
state must result either from a statute or, if the city has home rule,
from a provision of the city's home-rule charter. 165 The courts
traditionally apply the doctrine known as "Dillon's Rule" to these
two sources of power in order to determine if a specific municipal
power exists, i.e. the city has powers expressly or impliedly given by
these sources or essential to the declared purposes of the
municipality. 166 Thus, a statutory grant of authority to regulate
garages may imply the power to regulate the hours of operation of
service stations. 
167
Because the doctrine of "inherent home rule" has been almost
totally rejected in the United States, 168 municipalities can only
exercise home rule when authorized by state law and obtained,
through the method prescribed in the state law, by the particular city.
Where home rule applies, municipal laws will prevail over
conflicting state laws regarding matters of purely local concern. In
non-home rule municipalities, on the other hand, state laws always
prevail in situations of conflict. 169 In matters of statewide or general
164. Knight v. Johns, 137 So. 509, 510 (Miss. 1931) (invalidating as unreasonable a
closing ordinance for barbershops).
165. See Wagner, supra note 155, at 1063. See generally 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivions § 428-34 (1971). On interpreting
municipal charters, see Exparte Harrell, 79 So. 166, 167 (Fla. 1918) (rejecting contention that
general welfare clause of city charter granted power to enact closing ordinance applicable to
nearly all business, when ordinance not authorized by statute); Exparte Perkins, 226 S.W. 411
(Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (finding no power to pass closing ordinance for pool rooms under
charter).
166. See REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 135-39. See generally Sandalow, Limits of Municipal
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
167. See Bi-Lo Stations, Inc. v. Village of Alsip, 318 N.E. 2d 47, 50 (I11. App. Ct. 1974)
(interpreting state statutes).
168. See Fordhan &Asher, supra note 51, at 18. See generally REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at
66-74; Howard Lee McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16
COLUM. L. REv. 190, 299 (1916).
169. See Exparte Hitchcock, 166 P. 849 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (noting that municipal
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(rather than purely local) concern, however, including most exercises
of the police power, state law prevails over conflicting local law,
even in home-rule municipalities. 170 Thus, in the case of restrictions
on the permissible hours of liquor sales, state law will always prevail
over conflicting local restrictions, because this is clearly an area of
statewide concern. 171 The same is generally true regarding operating
hours restrictions for other businesses as well; the municipal
regulation is valid if, and only if, it does not conflict with state law,
whether the businesses affected are pool halls, 172 barbershops 173 or
any other establishment.
Occasionally, the state may preempt a field of regulation and left
no room for municipal laws at all. 174 Except in this relatively rare
circumstance, local closing laws must yield to state laws only if there
is a conflict. 175 Otherwise, the two laws may coexist, 176 with the
municipal restriction complementing the state law. 177 As one court
noted, "The preservation of the health, safety, welfare and comfort of
dwellers in urban centers of population often requires the
matters are those relating to internal business affairs of municipality). See generally REYNOLDS,
supra note 2, at 102-19.
170. As to what are matters of general or statewide concern, see Maurice H. Merrill,
Constitutional Home Rulefor Cities-Oklahoma Version, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 139, 159-61 (1952)
(noting inadequacy of treating "general" matters as those that affect the state or people at large
and proposing instead a "wider public interest" test).
171. See Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 58 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1944) (holding
city could not forbid liquor sales after midnight when state law expressly permitted liquor sales
at all hours). See generally Wagner, supra note 155, at 1063-64.
172. See Ex parte Brewer, 152 S.W. 1068, 1069 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) (finding no
conflict with state law).
173. See Eanes v. City of Detroit, 272 N.W. 896, 899 (Mich. 1927) (finding no conflict
between municipal closing ordinance and state statutory regulations).
174. See Mack Paramus Co. v. Mayor of Paramus, 511 A.2d 1179, 1184-87 (N.J. 1986)
(discussing preemption and finding that state's statutory Sunday blue law did not preempt local
Sunday closing regulations). On state preemption, see generally REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at
119-22.
175. As to the question of when a conflict is present, see REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 116-
19.
176. See Holsman v. Thomas, 147 N.E. 750, 751 (Ohio 1925) (finding no conflict between
municipal ordinance regulating length of time for which jewelry could be sold at auction during
year and state statute on appointment and licensing of persons to make sales by auction).
177. See Eanes v. City of Detroit, 272 N.W. at 897-99 (holding ordinance fixing open
hours for barber shops generally complementary to similar to state statute and valid, even
though specific ordinance was struck as not reasonably related to public health or general
welfare).
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enforcement of very different and usually much more stringent police
regulations in such district than is necessary in a State taken as a
whole."'178 Thus, a state law requiring taverns to close at 2:00 a.m.
and a municipal law requiring them to close at 1:00 a.m. may
legitimately coexist, because the local restriction merely sets a higher
standard than the state. 179 However, if state law expressly allows
taverns to stay open until 2:00 a.m., a municipal enactment requiring
them to close at 1:00 a.m. will conflict with the state law and be
void.180
XII. CONCLUSION
Municipalities have broad authority within the police power
usually delegated to them by the state to set closing hours for
businesses. The main limitations on the exercise are the due process
requirement of reasonable relationship to a police-power purpose and
the related equal protection requirement of a reasonable ground for
treating the particular business as different from others. Crime control
is probably the justification that courts most frequently and most
forcefully endorse as a valid basis for closing restrictions.18' Noise
control 82 and liquor control 83 have also often been found sufficient
grounds. Other health- or safety-related reasons for hours restrictions
178. City of Charleston v. Jenkins, 133 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 1963).
179. See Leavenworth Club Owners Ass'n v. Atchison, 492 P.2d 183 (Kan. 1971) (finding
no conflict between ordinance prohibiting serving of liquor between 1:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.
and statute prohibiting serving liquor between 3:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.); cf Beatrice Foods Co.
v. City of Okmulgee, 381 P.2d 863, 865 (Okla. 1963) (city could prescribe higher sanitation
standards for milk than set by state). But cf. Noey v. City of Saginaw, 261 N.W. 88, 89-90
(Mich. 1935) (holding state regulations as to closing hours binding on all liquor licensees and
not affected by city ordinance). For cases finding law prevails over local law in cases of
conflict, compare City of Coral Gables v. Seiferth, 87 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1956) (voiding
ordinance permitting septic tank contractors to connect buildings with sewers that conflicted
with state statute on plumbing); Arrow Club, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 131
N.W.2d 134, 139 (Neb. 1964) (voiding ordinances imposing restrictions on bottle clubs that
were not contained in state statute as inconsistent with the statute); Eastern Carolina Tastee-
Freez, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 123 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. 1962) (voiding ordinance prohibiting
peddling of ice cream on streets and sidewalks since conduct legal under state law).
180. See Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus,58 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1944).
181. See supra notes 61-90 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 6-31 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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have been of little significance. 184 On the other hand, courts have
specifically declared purposes such as the convenience of local
administrators or the limitation of competition improper.18 5 A
municipality desiring to enact, or seeking to defend, a closing
restriction can often best do so on the basis of maintaining the
peaceful order of the community and achieving "the deterrence of
crime and criminal activity." 186 It is better to close the business than
to invite the thief in the night-or so the municipal legislative body
may reasonably believe.
184. See supra notes 32-60 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
186. Gibbons v. City of Chicago, 214 N.E.2d 740, 743-44 (Ill. 1966).
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